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1.1 General overview 
The Penal Code
1
 is the principle statute that governs criminal offences and their punishments in 
Malawi.  Of particular interest among the various offences it provides is section 153 (a) and (c) 
which prohibits the commission of carnal knowledge against the order of nature.
2
  The 
proscription of consensual sodomy has attracted immense public debate and is often linked to the 
criminalisation of homosexuality.
3
  The thrust of the argument in these debates has been the 
justification and retention of sodomy laws vis a vis the repeal of such laws as they violate human 
rights.
4
   
In 2010, Malawi featured highly in the limelight of this debat  when it prosecuted and convicted 
two men under section 153 (a) and (c).
5
  It is through their trial process when it became apparent 
for Malawi, that the ramifications of the consensual sodomy law are quite grave on the rights of 
accused persons who fall under it. Notably, and for the first time, the case ignited an open 
discussion on the issue of homosexuality.  Unfortunately, as hard as justifying the proscription 
on consensual sodomy between adults is, it seems its review and abolishment in Malawi, might 
on the surface of it be close to impossible. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi, hereinafter referred to as the Code. 
2
 For the purpose of this study and ease of reference this law would also be referred to as the consensual sodomy 
law. 
3
 Human Rights Watch (2008) This alien legacy: the origin of ‘sodomy’ laws in British colonialism 4 
4
 Ottoson D (2008) State sponsored homophobia: a world survey of laws prohibiting same sex activity between 
consenting adults 45 
5













1.2 The problem 
The realities of the anti sodomy nature of section 153 of the Code were tested in the first ever 
same sex couple case of Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa.
6
 
Under the main charge of sodomy, the two men were convicted and given the maximum 
punishment offered by the offence.  During the course of their trial, the defence counsel made an 
application for leave to review the constitutionality of section 153 of the Code under which the 
two persons were charged.  The Chief Justice of the High Court and Supreme Court of Malawi 
dismissed the application on the grounds that it did not raise any constitutional issues to warrant 
the sitting of a Constitutional Court over the matter.  His ruling is of critical importance as it 
effectively limited the prospects of a constitutional review of section 153 (a) and (c) of the Code 
which criminalises sex between men with or without consent. 
Prior to the case of Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa,
7
  a 
special Law Commission task force was .created to review the Penal Code of Malawi.
8
  The 
Commission noted that there were some penal provisions that were inconsistent with the new 
Constitutional order.  Therefore, such provisions were to be reviewed and reformed to ensure 
conformity with the Constitution.
9
  Sadly, in 2011, despite such an ample review, the Penal Code 
still retained the impugned section 153 (a) and (c). Worse of it all, it introduced a new offence of 
indecent practices between females which has often been argued to criminalise same sexual 
conduct between females.
10
  This confirms further Malawi‟s rigidity to the promotion of minority 
rights. 
 
                                                          
6
 (note 5 above) 
7
 (note 5 above) 
8
 Malawi Law Commission (2007) Report of the Law Commission on the review of the Penal Code 1 
9
 (note 8 above) 3. It observed that newly adopted Malawi Constitution entrenches a bill of rights which envisages 
major law reform pertinent to penal law.  Importantly, the bill of rights enjoys the status of supremacy over all 
legislation and other sources of law.  Consequently any act of government or any law that is inconsistent with a 
provision of the bill of rights should be reviewed and reformed accordingly. 
10












1.3 Significance of the study 
The study has two major objectives.  Firstly, it will provide a discussion on the nature, impact 
and significance of section 153 (a) and (c) of the Code and the extent to which it violates the 
rights to equality, dignity and privacy.  Secondly, the thesis will examine the challenges and 
prospects of decriminalising section 153 (a) and (c) and make a recommendation on the way 
forward. 
This study makes no pretence in analysing section 153 (a) and (c) in the light of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Malawi and international human rights law. It is of critical importance as it 
highlights the unconstitutionality of the said provision and the need for its ultimate 
decriminalisation. The study hopes to make a contribution that regardless of existing challenges 
there is a possibility of repealing this law. In addition, this study is a contribution on the 
emerging debate of the law against consensual sodomy in Malawi, an area which has been left 
under wraps over the years.   
This study also points out impediments to the reform of section 153 (a) and (c) that need 
attention to from the legislature and other stakeholders and not necessarily through the Court 
process.  Thus it is significant to policy reform, legislative or otherwise without invoking the 
Courts.  
1.4 Methodology and Limitations 
The study will be conducted by desk research only. Malawi is the main focus area of study in the 
paper.  However, where necessary, examples will be drawn from other jurisdictions that had their 
colonial inherited sodomy laws invoked before the Courts.  Even though there is wealth of 
material on consensual sodomy, no scholars have comprehensively studied section 153(a) and 
(c).     
1.5 Chapter outline 
The study is comprised of five chapters, with this as the first and will proceed on the hypothesis 












the midst of challenges to such a declaration.  Chapter two will give comprehensive outline of 
the offence of carnal knowledge against the order of nature under section 153 of the Code. 
The ambiguities created by section 153 are analysed in chapter three where a critical discussion 
on the case of Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa will also be 
made. A constitutional analysis of section 153 (a) and (c) will be done and it will be argued that 
it impairs the rights to equality, privacy and dignity in a manner that is indefensible. 
Chapter four will highlight among others, how the requirement of locus standi in constitutional 
cases is a limitation to the constitutionality challenge of section 153 (a) and (c). It will also show 
how the current Malawi setup of the appointing judges of the High court by the Chief Justice to 
sit as a constitutional court is another hindrance to the decriminalisation of the provision. In 
addition, the possibilities of decriminalising the offence of sodomy will be explored. 

















THE CRIME OF SODOMY: A MALAWIAN PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
Section 153 of the Malawi Penal Code
11
 which provides for the offence of carnal knowledge 
against the order of nature is one of the provisions in the code which has survived any 
amendment or repeal ever since its codification.  This chapter discusses the nature and elements 
of the provision. It also highlights the effect of the scope of the provision and the Court‟s 
restrictive interpretation of the elements of the offence.  
2.2 The nature of the offence 
Section 153 stipulates that 
 Any person who- 
(a) has carnal knowledge against the order of nature; or 
(b) … 
(c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, 
 
 is be guilty of a felony and shall be liable to imprisonment for 14 years 
 
To have a full appreciation of the offence, it is important to note that section 153 was adopted 
from section 12 (1) of the British Sexual Offences Act, of 1956.  The provision simply provided 
that it is a crime for a person to commit buggery
12
 with another person.  The 1956 Act did not 
define or specify in detail the elements of the offence or the exact conduct the law was 
proscribing.  Going back to section 61 of the 1861 English statute on Offences against the 
Person, where section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act emanates from, it is explicit that the offence 
was regarded as a detestable crime.
13
  Thus for example, sodomy
14
 was defined by Coke
15
 as a 
                                                          
11
 Hereinafter referred to as the Code. 
12
 The term buggery was inspired from the medieval Latin „ bulgarus‟ which referred to a heretical religious sect 
from Bulgaria whose religious deviance included sexual deviance as well. 
13
 See section 61 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 which provides that anyone who commits the 
abominable crime of buggery with mankind or with any animal shall be liable for imprisonment for life or any term 












detestable and abominable sin amongst Christians not to be named, committed by carnal 
knowledge against the ordinance of the creator and order of nature, by mankind with mankind, or 
with a brute beast, or by womankind with a brute or beast.
16
 From the foregoing, section 153 (a) 
and(c) therefore makes an offence any carnal knowledge between two men or a man and a 
woman which is committed against the dictates of nature.  For instance, the nature of the offence 
under section 153 (a) and (c) of the Code was elaborated in the first reported case of sodomy in 
Malawi of Twaibu v Reginum
17
  
The state of the law, however is clear enough in England.  At common law the offence of sodomy is 
defined as sexual intercourse committed against the order of nature, i.e., in the anus by a man with a man or 
in the same unnatural manner by a man with a woman…  
The above is the literal interpretation of offence as it is provided for in the law.  Though a 
reading of the provision does not specify the type of sexual intercourse which is unlawful, the 
court takes the view that the offence is focused on anal intercourse.  The extent to which it 
includes acts between women and men as well is deb table as the trend in the gender of the 
parties to the crime on the few cases that have been brought before the Malawi courts
18
 has 
shown that it is an unnatural sexual intercourse between men that is a prohibition in this offence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1861 statute, bestiality is carnal knowledge against the order of nature with an animal while sodomy is carnal 
knowledge against the order of nature with mankind.  Sections 153(a) and (c) of the Code deal with the offence of 
sodomy only. Bestiality is specifically provided for under section 153 (b).  See also the Statute of Henry VIII of 
1533 which had the first codification on the crime of sodomy under the description of a detestable and abominable 
vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast. 
14
 The name sodomy comes from that of a Biblical city of Sodom whose men attracted the wrath of God for their 
evil ways.  It was alleged that the men of Sodom were having sexual intercourse with fellow men hence the 
proscription against sodomy which followed thereafter in the Numbers book of the Bible. (see note 9) 
15
 Sir Edward Coke (1797)The third part institutes of the laws of England,  3
rd
 part 58: cap X, “Of Buggery or 
Sodomy” 
16
 (note 5 above) 
17
 1961-63 ALR Mal 352 
18
 Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa Criminal Case Number 359 of 2009 
(Unreported) involved two men who were charged with sodomy after they conducted a traditional engagement 
ceremony. See also Republic v Betland Criminal Case No 159 of 2007, High Court (Unreported) and Twaibu v 












Whether this is due to under reporting of cases involving females and males or is simply a 
prosecutorial discretion not to bring before the Courts cases involving men and women is another 
issue beyond the scope of this paper.  
2.3 The rationale behind section 153 (a) and (c) 




 to the dynamics of a 
society. Section 153(a) and 153(c) creates what is commonly referred to as the offence of 
sodomy. Section 153(a) is for the active participant whereas s.153(c) is for the passive 
participant. The subsections codify the common law offence of sodomy. Unlike the offence of 
rape, consent is no defence to the charge under section 153(a) of the Penal Code
21
  
A study of the early British laws against sodomy from where section 153 (a) and (c) were 
exported from, shows that the purpose of creating the offence was to protect society against those 
who endangered Christian principles.
22
  The offence was designed to punish conduct which was 
viewed as defiling social purity and against the will of God.
23
  Further, the provision seemed to 
have been designed to enable the state obtain convictions even in cases involving adults who 
voluntarily consent to what is alleged as  carnal knowledge against the order of nature.  Thus the 
                                                          
19
 In Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa (note 8) the court held that the union of the 
two men was bizarre and could not be equated to any lawful marriage in Malawi.  It further observed that the society 
of Malawi was not ready to see its sons getting married to other sons. 
20
 This traces back to the Bible in the book of Leviticus 20 verse 13 which makes it a sin for a man to have sex with 
mankind as one does with a woman.  According to Thomas Aquinas quoted in Mills R „Male-male love and sex in 
the middle ages‟ in Matt Cook et al, A gay history of Britain (2007), sodomy is a subspecies of the sin against nature 
performed with a person of the same sex.  
21
 See Cram J in Twaibu v Reginum  (note 7) 532. 
22
 Most people who reportedly oppose consensual sodomy in the Malawi public media do so n the basis or religion 
and morality.  They argue that the practice is against the creation of man and woman as God designed them to be. 
See Muula A „Perceptions about men having sex with men in Southern African country: Case study of print media 
in Malawi 2007 Coat Med J 399.   See also Blackstone W, Commentaries on the laws of England (1767) who 
described the offence of carnal knowledge against the order of nature as an offence of deeper malignity than rape, a 
heinous act the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature and society.  It is important to note that 
Blackstone‟s commentaries had a profound effect on the development and expression of criminal law in the colonies 
of England like Malawi, India, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia,  just to mention a few. 
23












assumption inherent in the offence so defined is that, carnal activities against the order of nature 
contravene human integrity and pollutes society.   As a consequence, even if a victim can claim 
that he agreed to unnatural carnal activities, and is of full age, the act is still punishable because 
more than the person‟s will or body is at stake.  The defence of consent or that participants to the 
act are of full age and committed the offence in the realms of their own privacy is irrelevant.  
Other common reasons advanced for the criminal prohibition of sodomy is that; firstly it hinders 
procreation which is the basic purpose for a sexual relationship.
24
 The Malawi Classification 
Board previously known as the Censorship board is on record to have stated that all ethnic 
groups in Malawi recognise the happy natural arrangement of a man marrying a woman and that 
it is the basis of a healthy family institution.
25
  This arrangement fulfills the duty of mankind to 
procreate.  Anything to the contrary subverts the family institution.   
Lastly, it is also often argued that perpetrators of this crime corrupt and lead astray young 
persons.
26
  One fact that runs across the rationale for criminalizing unnatural sexual intercourse 
is that the offence is not just about the act, it has more to do  with society‟s moralistic prejudice 
against this type of sexual intercourse. 
2.4 Elements of the offence 
The essential elements of section 153 (a) and (c) are: 
a. carnal knowledge 
b. against the order of nature 
The prosecution has to prove that there was sexual intercourse committed against the order of 
nature regardless of the fact that the participants might have consented to the act.  It is worth to 
                                                          
24
 Burchell J Principles of criminal law (1997) 631 
25
 Kanyinji J „Big no to homosexuaity‟ The Sunday Times 20 February 2000 
26
  Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa (note 8) 23, the Court passed a scarring 
sentence to protect Malawi‟s sons and daughters from emulating the horrendous example set by the accused persons 












note that to a greater extent the elements of the offence were inherited from the English common 
law jurisprudence which is an authoritative source of law in Malawi.
27
 
2.4.1 Carnal knowledge 
The word „carnal‟ derives from the Latin word „carnalis‟ which means „fleshly‟. And when 
combined with knowledge, the meaning of knowledge has a biblical
28
 sense attached to it. The 
word „sexual relations‟.  In criminal law, the word carnal knowledge has had varying meanings 
at different times in different jurisdictions.  In Malawi, it is restrictively confined to specific 
sexual acts such as contact between a vagina and penis
29
 or between anus and penis.  In Twaibu v 
Reginum,
30
 the Court was drawn to an issue raised by the prosecution which was whether carnal 
knowledge meant there has to be an actual penetration of the anus as an essential element of the 
sodomy.  The Court took judicial notice of the fact that this was a novel point in the Malawi laws 
hence it resorted to how the English common law defined sexual intercourse in the cases of 
sodomy.
31
  The Court came to the conclusion that this meant anal sexual intercourse.
32
  Despite 
the fact that English law did not specify the elements of the offence in its criminal codes, there 
seemed to be a general agreement from its jurisprudence that the precise act that was prohibited 
was anal intercourse between men or between a man and a woman.
33
  In one of the earliest cases 
                                                          
27
 In the case of Twaibu v Reginum (note 7 above), Cram J held that the definition of the offence in Nyasaland is 
similar to that at common law hence English reported cases should be applied when deciding the constitutive 
elements of the offence.  Malawi used to be known as Nyasaland before it attained its independence from the British 
in 1964. 
28
 In the book of Genesis 4 verse 1 it is written that Adam „knew‟ his wife Eve and she conceived and bore Cain. 
29
 This is evident in the way rape is defined in section 132 of the Code.  It is limited to penetration of a woman‟s 
vagina by the male penis.  
30
 (note 7 above) 
31
 Twaibu v Reginum (note 7 above) 321 
32
 Ibid  
33












of Rex v Jacobs,
34
 it was held that fellatio or oral sexual stimulation was not encompassed under 
the common law elements of sodomy.   
At common law there was a tendency to equate the evidence required to prove the offence of 
rape with that of sodomy.
35
  Two factual issues in the case of rape are penetration and emission, 
but if the former is achieved, the latter is immaterial to the commission of the offence.
36
 
However, mere emission in the course of a sexual assault on a woman without penetration does 
not amount to rape.  This was considered in the case of R v Reekspear
37
 and adopted in Twaibu v 
Reginum
38
  where on a charge of sodomy penetration of the anus was proved but emission into 
the body did not result on account of an interruption during the act.  The court affirmed that in a 
case of sodomy the crime is committed if the jury is satisfied that penetration of the anus took 
place.  Even though the English law on sodomy has tremendously changed, the position remains 
the same in Malawi.
39
  Carnal knowledge in respect of this offence is still interpreted as anal 
sexual intercourse.
40
 Thus, the present stance of the law in Malawi is that the offence is 
committed only by the insertion of the penis of one party in the anus of the other. 
  
                                                          
34
 (1817) Russ. & Ry. 331;168 E.R. 830 where a man was convicted of sodomy based on evidence that he engaged 
in oral sex with a 7 year old boy.  The court was of the view that the man be pardoned because this did not constitute 
the crime of sodomy.  That is, for one to be guilty of sodomy, the act must have performed where sodomy is usually 
committed 
35
 Twaibu v Reginum, (note 7 above) 
36
 Twaibu v Reginum (Note 7 above) 
37
 (1832) 1 Mood C.C. 341; 168 E.R. 1296 
38




 century was an era of major criminal law reform in England.  In 1954, noting among others that the 
meaning of sodomy had varied widely over the ages and had included at times everything from heterosexual 
intercourse in atypical positions to oral sexual contact, the government set up the Wolfenden Committee to review 
its laws on the same.   The Committee recommended a vast modification and containment of same sex sexual 
offences, removing adult consensual conduct from the realms of the criminal law. It was until 1967 when the 
English parliament finally changed the laws on England in its Sexual Offences Act with a limitation on the age of 
consent.  See Kirby MD, „Lessons from the Wolfenden Report‟ (2008) 34 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 551 
40
 This reasoning is evident in the recent case of The Republic v Tiwonge Chimbalanga and Steven Monjeza Soko 












2.4.2 Against the order of nature 
In analysing the elements of the offence in section 153 (a) and (c), the Court in The Republic v 
Tiwonge Chimbalanga and Steven Monjeza Soko said: 
The state must prove that Steven had carnal knowledge of Tiwonge.  The State must also prove that 
Tiwonge allowed Steven carnal knowledge.  In any case if this is proved, the method used should be 
deemed to have been against the order of nature because the two are men.
41
 
The above case defined unnatural sex as sex through the anus. Arguably, it seems any sexual 
intercourse that does not involve contact of a vagina and penis is against the order of nature 
hence it is deemed unnatural.  It is not surprising that the offence falls under unnatural offences 
in the Code.  In this context, the Court‟s view on sexual acts that qualify as being committed 
against the order of nature seems to be attached to biology and morality.
42
  By incorporating this 
element of the offence, the Courts merely embrace the long tradition of western culture that 
generally condemned all sexual acts other than heterosexual vaginal intercourse committed for 
the sole purpose of procreation.  In this case, the conduct of an accused is perceived as unnatural 
and against the order of nature if the anus is used for sexual gratification.  In the Chimbalanga 
and Soko case, the Court is seen to be clinging to the old reasoning of the English decision in 
Jacobs
43
 that all natural forms of intercourse are not within the meaning sodomy.  The holding of 
the Jacobs
44
 case seems to be widely accepted and upheld in the few sodomy cases that have 
been brought before the Malawi courts. Hence, to prove that the sexual penetration was against 
the order of nature, the prosecution simply needs to show that penetration was per anus and it 
was between males.  Any other type of penetration apart from that does not constitute the 
offence.  
                                                          
41
 (note 8 above) 
42
 In The Republic v Tiwonge Chimbalanga and Steven Monjeza Soko (note 8), the court found that the conduct of 
the accused persons was against public morals.  It is interesting to note that many countries that share the English 
common law doctrines link morality and common decency.  In England, the legislature was not expected to enact 
laws that contradicted the wishes of the majority because it was believed that they only had to represent the views of 
the people. See Dicey 55 Lectures on the relationship between law and public opinion in England during the 19
th
 
century, quoted in Gray P Unitary, self correcting democracy and the public law (1990) 111 
43
 (note 24 above) 
44

















 on the ground that oral sex was not well known at the time of that 
decision.  The Court was of the view that had the English judges been more sexually 
sophisticated at that time, they would have held otherwise. 
47
  Similar sentiments were shared in 
Government v Bapoji Bhatt
48
 where a case was brought under section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code of 1860
49
 which is in the same fashion as section 153 of the Penal Code of Malawi.  The 
issue before the Court was whether oral sex amounted to an offence under section 377.
50
  It was 
held that the provision punishes persons who engage in carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature.
51
  Further to that, where oral sex is committed, it is clearly against the order of nature, 
because the natural object of carnal intercourse is that there should be the possibility of 
conception of human beings, which in the case of coitus per mouth is impossible.
52
  Thus, it was 
observed that carnal intercourse against the order of nature could not be extended to include acts 
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  Ultimately, the case was dismissed because it was thought that the sexual act must 
engage the body part where sodomy is usually committed, that is, the anus. 
The local jurisprudence in Malawi has haphazardly dealt with the issue of whether oral sex or 
other forms of lurid sexual intercourse are crimes against the order of nature in one case only.
54
  
Nevertheless, one can safely assume how such an issue is likely to be addressed if we look at the 
way the Courts have interpreted the constitutive elements of the offence.  As has been indicated, 




 which regards 
penetration of the anus as an important element of the offence.  And the recent Malawian 
expansion on this is that it is when anal intercourse is committed by two men that it is against the 
order of nature.
57
 In Republic v Raphael Malira
58
 a charge of indecent assault was preferred 
where a male had sexual intercourse per anum with his niece.  The same line of thinking is also 
evident in the Courts of Zimbabwe
59
 when faced with cases brought under section 73 (1) of the 
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act.
60
  For instance, mutual masturbation between 
males with consent has been held to be against the order of nature hence qualifies for the crime 
Thus, here we find another confirmation on the ancient reasoning that the purpose of sexual 
intercourse is procreation and any sex which does not lead to procreation is against the 
prescriptions of nature.  
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2.5 The implication of the scope of section 153 (a) and (c) 
Firstly, if we construe a literal interpretation of section 153 (a) and (c), the perpetrators of 
sodomy can either be male or female.  In addition, the provision is quite clear that both parties to 
the offence are offenders.  This is one of the very few offences in criminal law that has no 
individual complainant. Notwithstanding the interpretation of unnatural offence by Cram J in 
Twaibu v Reginum,
61
 there are apparent ambiguities created in the drafting of section 153(a) and 
153(c) of the Penal Code.  It is notable from the decided cases and from the common law 
principles that natural sex denotes penetration of a man‟s penis into a woman‟s vagina. 
Arguably, the framers of section 153 of the Penal Code intended to criminalise penetration of the 
penis into either a man‟s or a woman‟s vagina.  This is despite the fact that the word sodomy 
does not appear anywhere in the section. Now, if natural sex involves penetration of a man‟s 
penis into a woman‟s vagina, would penetration of a man‟s penis into a woman‟s mouth 
constitute natural sex or unnatural sex?  Put it clearly, is oral sex natural?  Possibly, when Cram J 
in Twaibu v Reginum  held that penetration of the  mouth did not amount to unnatural offence he 
actually was grappling with the ambiguities created by the subsections (a) and (c) of section 153 
above.  The fact that heterosexuals are also susceptible to commit the crime compounds the 
problem of lack of clarity further.   
As pointed out earlier, the cases under this provision that have been brought before the Courts of 
law indicate that the parties who will be rightly convicted of sodomy are males.  Where a female 
and male have anal intercourse, the charge that is preferred is indecent assault and not sodomy.  
The question that arises is, is the proscription in section 153 (a) and (c) of the Code restricted to 
certain sexual acts? Or without beating about the bush, is generally on homosexuality?  In light 
of a recent amendment to the Penal Code which has introduced a new offence on indecent 
practices between females
62
, one can rightly assume that criminal law is against sexual activities 
between members of the same sex and not just the unnaturalness of a particular act. 
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In addition, is the provision explicit enough to justify the confinement of the meaning of carnal 
knowledge to anal sexual intercourse only? If the basis for making the offence unnatural boils 
down to fact that it does not lead to procreation, then it would rightly follow that other forms of 
sexual activity for example oral sex, mutual masturbation and peno-vaginal sex with 
contraception should all be criminalised.  From the discussion above, it is clear that section 
153(a) and 153(c) would fall foul of the principle against doubtful penalization.  As to doubtful 
penalisation Brett J in Dickenson v Fletcher made the following observations: 
Those who contend that a penalty may be inflicted must show that the words of the Act distinctly enact that 
it shall be incurred under the present circumstances. They must fail if the words are merely equally capable 
of a construction that would, and one that would not inflict the penalty.
63
 
The principle against doubtful penalisation has never been mounted in trials under section 153 
(a) and (c) of the Penal Code.  Nonetheless, that does not mean that the section is clear and 
unambiguous. 
Furthermore, the scope of section 153(a) and (c) ignores an important possibility of consent.  The 
act is still punishable even if where there is consent and the parties are of full age. It is irrelevant 
even if the forbidden act is done in private.  The implication of this disregard is that male adult 
abusers of young boys, men who rape other men and men who freely consent to indulge in 
sexual intercourse are all one and the same thing.  In these circumstances, consensual unnatural 
carnal knowledge is being equated to the crime rape. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the nature of section 153 (a) and (c) and the implications it brings 
therein.  It has shown that the scope of the offence in Malawian law, even though it is clear 
enough in wording to apply to both males and females, in practice it is used to proscribe sexual 
intercourse between men including those who do it consensually.  It has also indicated the 
Court‟s restrictive interpretation on the constitutive elements of the offence which is directed at 
anal intercourse between males only.  Form the foregoing, can section 153 (a) and (c) stand a 
constitutional test in light of the principle of the rights to equality, dignity and privacy?  Through 
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an analysis of The Republic v Tiwonge Chimbalanga and Steven Monjeza Soko,
64
  these 
questions will be considered in the next chapter. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 153 
3.1 Introduction 
In Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa v The Republic,
65
  an application was 
made for the Chief Justice‟s declaration that the criminal charges brought under section 153 of 
the Code related to the interpretation and application of the Constitution of Republic of 
Malawi.
66
  The Chief Justice dismissed the application in its entirety on grounds that the criminal 
proceedings in question dealt with criminal offences under the Penal Code namely the offence of 
buggery and indecent practices.  And that these offences have no bearing on the constitutional 
rights of privacy, dignity and non discrimination.
67
  In this chapter, the paper provides an 
analysis of the criminal proceedings in Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa 
v the Republic and highlights the constitutional issues that can be raised from it.   This chapter 
further argues that contrary to the Chief Justice‟s assertion, section 153 of the Code impugns on 
the rights to equality, privacy and dignity.  
3.2 The facts in the Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa Case 
On 26
th
 December 2009, Steven Monjeza Soko,
68
 aged 26 and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa
69
 
aged 20 conducted the first ever same sex traditional engagement ceremony at Blantyre city in 
Malawi.  Soon after their public ceremony, the two men were arrested.  Steven was charged with 
buggery or having carnal knowledge against the order of nature contrary to section 153 (a) of the 
Penal Code.  Tionge was charged with buggery or permitting Steven to have carnal knowledge of 
him against the order of nature contrary to section 153 (c) of the Penal Code.  In the alternative, 
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Steven and Tionge were also charged with gross indecency
70
, the subject of which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. They pleaded not guilty to the charges.  The main issue to be decided by the 
Court was whether the two had carnal knowledge against the order of nature. 
3.2.1 The evidence 
In proving the allegations brought against Steven and Tionge, the State paraded a total of 9 
witnesses. 
The first witness was a grandmother to Steven who told the court that in October 2009 Steven 
introduced Tionge to her as his wife and that the two were cohabiting.
71
  She said she recalled 
asking Steven whether Tionge was male or female because according to her, Tionge did not have 
feminine features such as breasts.
72
  The second witness was a church elder at Abraham Church 
of which Tionge was a member.
73
 He testified that Tionge told him that they were a couple with 
Steven and had plans of getting married.
74




The evidence of the third witness was quite illuminating.  She told the Court that she knew both 
Tionge and Steven and that Tionge was her friend and she had always known him as a woman. 
76
  
She said she even lent Tionge her traditional cloth for his engagement to Steven.
77
  She went 
further to state that after the engagement ceremony someone brought her a newspaper and told 
her that she had been chatting with a male all along because the paper had revealed that Tionge 
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  She was not amused and, together with a female friend they proceeded to Tionge‟s 
house to verify what was reported in the news.
79
  They were joined by another (the fourth State 
witness) and the three of them summoned Steven and Tionge.
80
  Steven is said to have confirmed 
that Tionge was his wife and that he slept with him.
81
  The witness said Tionge voluntarily took 
off his clothes and she saw that he had male genitalia.
82
  However, during cross examination the 
witness admitted that she together with the other women undressed Tionge.
83
 
Tionge‟s employer who was the fourth witness said she employed him as a woman.  She stated 
that Tionge introduced Steven as his husband.  She further said that she was present when 
Tionge was asked to undress and she saw that he had male private parts.  She personally asked 
Tionge how the two were having sex and Tionge said that Steven would do it anywhere he 
wanted, including the anus.  The evidence of the fifth witness was that she was among the group 
of women that confronted Tionge about him being a man. She also said she was present when 
Tionge voluntarily undressed and confirmed that he was having sex through the anus or by the 
thigh with Steven.
84
   
A photographer who took pictures of the engagement ceremony between Steven and Tionge was 
the sixth witness.
85
  He did not aver much only to state that he was engaged to take picures of 
Tionge and Steven during the engagement ceremony. 
The seventh witness was an obstet ician and gynecologist.
86
  He was requested by the Police to 
conduct an examination on Tionge.
87
  He was asked to make an assessment on whether Tionge 
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was male or female. In addition, he was to find out if Tionge had been involved in sexual 
intercourse.
88
  The witness was unable to establish if Tionge was involved in anal sex because it 
was not within an area of his expertise.
89
  He said that there was no one in Malawi who could do 
it.
90
  He however confirmed that Tionge was a man.
91
   
A psychiatrist who was the eighth witness presented his findings on the fitness of Tionge and 
Steve to stand trial.
92
  He also testified that Tionge had gender disorientation as he regarded 
himself as a woman.
93
   
The last witness was a police officer who arrested and obtained a confession statement from 
Steven and Tionge.   
Tionge and Steven are said to have admitted to having anal sexual intercourse.
94
  In defence, the 
two exercised their right to remain silent. 
3.2.2 The judgment 
The Court found Steven guilty of having carnal knowledge of Tionge through the anus of  
Tionge which it held was against the order of nature contrary to section 153 (a) of the Penal 
Code.
95
 Tionge was convicted of permitting Steven to have carnal knowledge of him through his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
86
 (note 7above) 6 
87
 Ibid  
88
 Ibid  
89
























anus which the court also found to be against the order of nature.
96
  It was the Court‟s view that 
the evidence brought before it was sufficient enough to conclude that the two men were having 
sex against the order of nature.  This finding was based on the fact they were living together as 
husband and wife, had publicly become engaged and had confessed to the police and some of the 
witnesses that they had been having anal sex together.  The Court further observed that an 
engagement in Malawi happens between a man and a woman.  Therefore, when two people both 
being male live together as husband and wife [as in the in the circumstances of Steven and 
Tionge], their conduct is beyond doubt contrary to the accepted moral conduct.  It is the type of 
conduct that transgresses the Malawian standards of living. 
3.2.3 The sentence 
Steven and Tionge were sentenced to 14 years imprisonment which is the maximum punishment 
reserved for the offence. In justifying the harsh sentence, the Court said that the crime committed 
carried a sense of shock to the Malawian society.
97
  Further to that the two men seemed to be 
proud of what they did and did not show remorse at all.
98
  The Court could not imagine a more 
aggravated sodomy than where perpetrators seek heroism in public.
99
 The Court observed that 




A submission in mitigation of sentence was made by the defence counsel.  He said among others, 
the court should show some leniency to the two offenders.
101
  He said they should be forgiven, 
loved, preached to and incorporated or they should receive counseling at a mental hospital.   
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3.3 Some reflections on the case and the general perceptions about men who have sex with 
fellow men 
This section brings insights from the case and links such with how persons charged with sodomy 
under section 153 of the Code are discriminated against and how their right to privacy and 
dignity can be violated in Malawi.  The reflections evolve from the manner in which Tionge and 
Steven were treated by the court of law and the general public. 
3.3.1 On the offence itself  
Firstly, it is worth noting that the offence of carnal knowledge against the order of nature in 
Malawian law, even though is explicit enough, by the wording in the provision that it applies to 
any persons, that is, both heterosexuals and homosexuals, in practice it targets sex between men 
including where it is done consensually.  The offence is generally perceived as sexual intercourse 
per anus between males. The Court relied on the old common law definition of sodomy that it is 
anal sex between men. No comment was made in respect to the fifth witness‟ evidence that 
Tionge said he would have thigh sex with Steven as well. This restrictive approach has a strong 
likelihood of confining the offenders of section 153 (a) and (c) to males only.  It is evident in the 
judgment that a traditional engagement let alone sex between two men are abhorrent.  This type 
of sex is not within the confines of nature.  It constitutes conduct that is not only shocking but 
uncalled for in the Malawian society.
102
  Similar opinions can be drawn from the witnesses‟ 
testimonies in the case.  The consensus seems to be that no sound man can have sex with another 
man. This can be observed from one of the female witnesses who seemed to have been annoyed 
that she did not know that she had been chatting with a male who was having sex with another 
male. 
3.3.2 Morality vis a vis sodomy 
The Court‟s finding that Steven and Tionge had to be punished severely for their lack of remorse 
is alao indicative of its perception that what the offenders did was inconceivable, for which they 
should be ashamed of and apologise for.  The prosecution‟s submission that, if not punished, 
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Steven and Tionge‟s conduct would corrupt public morality seems to be based on the belief that 
in Malawi, sex between males is immorality of the highest order and must be met with a stiff 
punishment. 
The reaction of Malawians including senior government officials towards the arrest, conviction 
of the two men and generally to issues of homosexuality is interestingly unfortunate. For 
instance, President Bingu Wa Muntharika
103
 is on record to have vowed that under his leadership 
he would never legalise homosexuality.  He referred to those who have sex with other men as 
satanic, worse than dogs and that such activities are disgusting.
104
  The then Deputy Minister of 
Information and Civic Education told the press that as far as the Malawi government was 
concerned there were only two homosexuals in Malawi namely Steven Monjeza and Tionge 
Chimbalanga.  The minister further said that if there were any other homosexuals in country they 
were to come out in the open and face arrests.
105
  Soon afterwards, an operation to arrest 
homosexuals was launched by the Malawi Police Force.
106
   
A member of the Clergy is reported to have said that homosexual acts are such a disgrace so 
much so that those practicing it are timid to come out in the open.
107
  One wonders how men who 
have consensual sex with other men would come out in the open when first of all there is a law 
proscribing it, secondly, senior government officials are giving warnings to arrest the men who 
would brave it to come out in the open  and thirdly the state police established a special operation 
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to apprehend such persons. The issue therefore is not about the men in question being timid but 
rather the fear for their lives in the midst of the proscription of the law and the possible arrests.  
It is about the stigma and negative differential treatment that these men face even from the State 
which ideally is supposed to protect them. 
3.3.3 Consensual sodomy is evil and a disease 
 The defence counsel submitted in mitigation of sentence that Steven and Tionge did not deserve 
to be given a sentence of imprisonment.
108
 His view was that prayer and psychiatric counseling 
could be the appropriate manner to deal with persons involved in sodomy.  The link between 
same sex relations and religion seem to be shared by many. Professor Etta Banda who was the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs is on record to have said that same sex relations were against 
Malawi‟s religious and cultural values.
109
 The Public Affairs Committee of Malawi
110
 released a 
press statement in which it stated that basing on religious teachings, the Commitee held the view 
that homosexuality is immoral and sinful.  In addition, the Committee believed that the weakness 
in individuals practicing homosexuality could be dealt with through prayer.
111
  Sexual activities 
between males were described as sinful and should be purged.
112
  It was reported that Malawi 
needs transformation as there is too much wickedness happening.
113
  
From the foregoing statements including the submissions made by the lawyer who supposedly 
was to represent the interests of Steven and Tionge, males who have sex with fellow males are 
sinners and need divine intervention to abandon their immoral activities so that they become 
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spiritually strong individuals of integrity.  The defence counsel‟s proposal for psychiatric 
counseling in respect of Steven and Tionge at a mental institution implies that men who conduct 
themselves in homosexual activities are mentally sick and in need of specialized care by a 
psychiatrist.  The print media has often reported sex between males or homosexual practices as 
social and psychological problems of the individuals concerned.  For instance, it was reported in 
one of the common daily papers in Malawi that: „Homosexuality is a psychological problem 
affecting people in the western countries, which should not be normalized in African countries 
like Malawi in the name of human rights.‟
114
  
3.3.4 Consensual sodomy is committed by sub humans only 
In a newspaper debate on the possibility of decriminalizing the law on sodomy, one journalist 
wrote; „We have better things to worry about than to waste time and resources discussing 
homosexuality, a way of life that does not even exist among dogs and pigs.‟
115
 To the ordinary 
Malawian, dogs and pigs despite being man‟s friend are regarded as unclean and are despised.
116
 
Doggish behavior is typically associated with disorientation, ill mannerism and lack of purpose 
in life.   Hence a comparison to dogs and pigs indicates how low and stigmatized homosexuals 
are perceived in the Malawian society.
117
  The criminalization of sodomy and the justifications 
that people raise for this law gives homosexuality a subhuman status.  Men who prefer to have 
sex with other males are stigmatized and afraid to come out and enjoy the inherent freedoms that 
any individual is entitled to.  They are isolated and wrongly judged because of their sexual 
orientation status.  We see Steven and Tionge being treated as outcasts by the Court, prosecution 
witnesses and the media.  They were perceived as deviants because of their sexual conduct and 
traditional engagement which is deemed as horrendous to the Malawian society. 
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One other observation made in the case analysis relates to the way in which Tionge was 
compelled to undress before three women. It was inhuman, degrading and also an intrusion to his 
personhood.  His body was neither respected nor accorded some privacy.  On a number of 
occasions, Tionge was undressed and his male genitalia displayed and examined by different 
people who were so eager to share their findings with the public and the media.  To add insult to 
injury, their conclusions were widely published by the media across Malawi.  The viewing of 
Tionges‟s private parts was possibly under the curiosity and the misguided disbelief on how a 
man can have sex with another man.  This indicates that the intimate and of course private life of 
a homosexual can be invaded regardless of whether it is justifiable or not.   
3.3.5 Would heterosexual couples be subjected to the same treatment if established that 
they were having anal sex? 
It is quite doubtful if it would have been the same treatment in a case of a husband having 
consensual anal sex with a wife.  It is quite doubtful whether a husband having consensual anal 
sex would receive the same treatment as the one Steven and Tionge got. In such a scenario, the 
man and woman would given the due respect and privacy they need.  It is even more doubtful if 
a case where a woman permits a man to have carnal knowledge of her against the order of nature 
would be prosecuted let alone whether the perpetrators would be arrested.  This uncertainty 
further exists in light of Malawi Law Commission‟s justification of the rejection of a proposal to 
include marital rape in the Penal Code.
118
  The commission argued that prosecution of husband 
and wife in such circumstances has the effect of opening up to the general public the private 
relations of husband and wife, which for valid social and family reasons should be strongly 
protected.
119
  The Law Commission‟s reasoning demonstrates the importance of respecting the 
privacy of persons‟ intimate relations.  It indicates that there is some sort of personal space 
which the State is not justified to interfere.  Sadly it seems in Malawi, the beneficiaries of this 
recognition of privacy are heterosexuals.  This is so regardless of the fact that marital rape lacks 
consent whereas in consensual sodomy there is an agreement between the two to have that type 
of sex.          
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Steven and Tionge who were traditionally engaged
120
 must have been unlucky to be men who 
freely chose to have anal sex because the law and the public do not afford a strong protection to 
such private relations.  In these circumstances, when privacy is viewed as an idealogy that serves 
to bolster the heterosexual nuclear family, it will not protect the interests of those who are 
outside such a frame work like Steven and Tionge. 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, the law reviewing and reforming function of the Law 
Commission can be related to that of the Courts.  They become both productive in nature.  It 
goes further to reinforcing the people‟s perception on the norms of society.  However, in the 
performance of this function, the Commission should always bear in mind to strike a balance 
between societal norms, the law, foundational principles of the Constitution and the minimum 
standards of international human rights law.  
3.3.6 Investigation and prosecution difficulties 
Lastly, the case study shows that the criminalization of consensual sodomy presents difficulties 
in investigating and prosecuting the offence.
121
  The challenge lies in how to lawfully obtain 
evidence for a sexual act that is usually done in private.
122
 In passing judgment against Steven 
and Tionge, the Court observed that neither the doctor nor any of the other witnesses could 
adduce direct evidence that the accused had carnal knowledge against the order of nature. Hence 
you find that enforcement of anti sodomy laws like section 153 of the Penal Code becomes 
pervasive and degrading to the persons involved.  
For example, in the name of gathering evidence, Tionge and Steven were given a less human 
status and their bodies were treated with no respect at all. To determine whether anal sex took 
place and if Tionge was indeed a man, the two men were compelled to undergo medical tests 
without their consent and show their private parts to different people including women.   This 
was not only inhuman and degrading but also a total disregard of a man‟s ego.  However, 
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nowhere do we see the Court condemning such conduct and in actual fact it went ahead to rely 
on evidence which was obtained in this manner.  
All things considered, does the above practical example of the case of Steven Monjeza Soko and 
Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa which was on consensual sodomy under section 153 (a) and (c) of 
the Penal Code bring insights on the constitutional concerns that can be raised in the  provision? 
The discussion below will assess whether section 153 (a) and (c) can be declared 
unconstitutional in relation to the rights of equality, dignity and privacy. 
3.4 The basis of the Constitutionality challenge 
The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi
123
 is the supreme law of the land and all people are 
entitled to equal protection under it.  Section 4 of the Constitution provides:  
This Constitution shall bind all the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State at all levels of the 
Government and all the peoples of Malawi are entitled to the equal protection of this Constitution, and laws 
made under it.
124
   
Further, the validity of any act of Government or any law is to be tested by the extent of its 
consistency with the provisions of the Constitution.
125
  Therefore to successfully challenge the 
constitutionality of sections 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code it has to be shown that the criminal 
proscription is unconstitutional in that it is in contradiction with the provisions of the 
Constitution.  A Court of law is to have recourse to section 11 of the Constitution when 
interpreting the provisions thereof.  Section 11 of the Constitution states as follows: 
(1) Appropriate principles of interpretation of this Constitution shall be developed and employed by the 
courts to reflect the unique character and supreme status of this Constitution. 
(2) In interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall- 
(a) promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society 
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(b) take full account of  the provisions of Chapter III and IV; and 




The importance of understanding the impact of the Constitution on the proscription against 
sodomy in section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code cannot be underestimated.  It has been 
argued that the use of the word “shall” in section 11 (2) indicates that is mandatory for Malawian 
courts to consider international law whenever the latter is relevant to the provision being 
interpreted.
127
  The international human rights standards to be considered are not limited to 
treaties binding on Malawi.
128
  The Courts are entitled to have recourse to other international law 
norms not ratified by Malawi and soft law norms.
129
  In determining whether a limitation of a 
right is constitutionally allowed, one factor to be considered by the Court is whether it is 
recognisable by international human rights standards. 
130
  In light of this provision, the Courts 
have relied on foreign case law in resolving constitutional issues such as the scope and meaning 
of rights.  Much as section 211 of the Constitution provides for the domestication of international 
law, it also recognises the continued application of customary international law so long as it is 
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament. International 
law may be binding or persuasive whereas foreign case law has a persuasive effect only.  
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In February 1990, Malawi ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights
131
 and in 
December 1993 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
132
 was ratified.  The 
ratification of these treaties has no reservations or declarative interpretations.  Despite the treaties 
being non domesticated, Malawi still has international obligation towards the implementation 
thereof as some provisions of the treaties like the ICCPR now form part of international 
customary law which is binding on all States. 
3.5 Grounds for the challenge 
3.5.1 Infringement of the right to equality  
The starting point is section 20 (1) of the Constitution which is as follows:  
(1)Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are, under any law, guaranteed equal 
and effective protection against discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, ethnic or social origin, 
disability property or other status. 
(2) legislation may be passed addressing inequalities in society and prohibiting discriminatory practices and 
the propagation of such practices and may render such practices criminally punishable by courts. 
A reading of section 20 (1) indicates that the provision is a general prohibition on discrimination, 
which in essence comprises of a negative protection of the right to equality.
133
 This prohibition is 
both in law and in fact.
134
  That is to say, the State cannot pass discriminatory laws or conduct 
itself in a manner which discriminates.
135
 Further, there are other forms of positive 
discrimination that are allowed with the exception of those grounds provided for in the 
section.
136
  At the same time, one can contend that by virtue of having “other status” as a ground 
for discrimination, the list of grounds is non exhaustive.  That aside, what is clear cut from 
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section 20 (1) is that it is insufficient to rely on discrimination in its generality.  It must be shown 





 have held that there are four elements of 
discrimination. In addition to the already stated two; at least two or more people must have been 
treated differently; the differentiation must amount to inferior treatment, place the person at a 
disadvantage, or deprive him or her benefits, privileges or rights. 
The Constitution does not define what constitutes “other status.” However, in Banda v Lekha,
139
  
the Industrial Relations Court held that section 20 of the Constitution prohibits unfair 
discrimination against persons in any form.
140
  Further to that, although the section does not 
specifically cite discrimination on the basis of one‟s HIV status, it is to be implied that it is 
covered in the general statement of anti discrimination in any form.
141
  The court went on state to 
that this is why the South African Constitutional Court in Hoffman v South African Airways held 
that: 
The need to eliminate unfair discrimination does not arise only from Chapter 2 of our Constitution. It also 
arises out of international obligations. South Africa has ratified a range of anti discrimination Conventions, 
including the African Charter on Human Rights. In the preamble to the African Charter, member States 
undertake, amongst other things, to dismantle all forms of discrimination. Article 2 prohibits discrimination 
of any kind. In terms of Article 1, member States have an obligation to give effect to the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Charter...
142
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It was the Court‟s view that the position on anti discrimination enunciated in the Hoffman case 
fits squarely with the situation in Malawi.
143
 Malawi ratified the African Charter and this places a 
constitutional duty on the State to invalidate legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution 
or does not promote the fundamental rights entrenched in the Charter.
144
  In that sense, then 
arguably the spirit of the Constitution of Malawi would demand that “other status” should be a 
wide and open ended concept because exclusion from the ambit of section 20 (1) has far reaching 
consequences on relying on other rights. 
Therefore, despite the lack of an explicit definition on “other status”, there is room to fully 
accommodate the argument that nothing bars one from interpreting the said phrase as including 
sexual orientation.
145
  It is important to note that, in interpreting Article 2 of the African 
Charter,
146
the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights observed that the words 
“other status” in Article 2 could be interpreted to include sexual orientation.
147
 It has been 
contended that the use of the phrases “such as” and “other status” in Article 2 of the Charter 
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clearly shows that the list for unacceptable grounds for discrimination is not exhaustive.
148
  It is 
argued that this language suggests that the drafters foresaw that the African Charter permits for 
an expansion of the specific grounds, hence accepting the principle that the exact content of the 
Charter will not be frozen in time.
149
  Therefore, there should be no limit to the growth that could 
be allowed. 
 
Against this background, it is hereby argued that the proscription in section 153 (a) and (c) 
relates to a type of sexual conduct which is anal sex. This criminal law is based on the fact that 
anal sex is an unnatural act just like bestiality. Even though the impugned Penal provision may 
on the face of it appear to envisage both male and female sexual acts, apparently it unfairly 
targets sexual acts of a specified class of persons. Justice Mwaungulu
150
 said „Unfortunately, 
sodomy, and we judges take judicial notice occurs very frequently as normal sexual behaviour 
among the married and prisoners who may be heterosexual. However, it is more incident among 
gays where it is their way of sexual expression.‟ In reality, it is when males are erotically 
attracted to fellow males that section 153 (a) and (c) is invoked and seen in operation.  The truth 
of the matter is that the unnatural sexual act that is criminalized by this provision is associated 
with homosexuals as a group. 
 
Section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code has the effect of viewing all homosexuals as criminals.  
When everything associated with homosexuality is treated as criminal, the whole homosexual 
community is marked with deviance and perversity.  They are subject to extensive prejudice 
because of what they are or what they are perceived to be, not because of what they do.  As a 
consequence, the minority group of the population is, because of its sexual orientation, 
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persecuted and marginalized.  Looking at the case of Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge 
Chimbalanga Kachepa,
151
 it is evident that the two men were treated as outcasts by the 
Government of Malawi, state witnesses, the Court, media and the public.  The unfair treatment 
that was accorded to these men was not on the basis that someone caught them red handed 
having anal sex but because they accepted themselves as homosexuals by virtue of their public 
traditional engagement.  Hence they were perceived to have performed homosexual acts like anal 
sex which according to the Penal Code is deemed an unnatural offence. They were discriminated 
against on the basis of the erotic attraction between them.  It is important to note that this social 




3.5.2 Discrimination based on sex 
Section 153 (a) and (c) is discriminatory in nature based on sex.  Section 20 (1) of the 
Constitution prohibits discrimination on several enumerated grounds including “sex”. In Malawi 
Congress Party & Others v Attorney General & Another,
153
 the Malawi High Court held that the 
right to equality prohibits an impermissible criterion or a classification arbitrarily used to burden 
a group of individuals.  For instance, a company cannot refuse to promote a woman to a 
management position based on her sex or gender.  While men and women are of different sexes, 
that difference does not justify treating women differently.  A sex-based discrimination was 
found by the Malawi High Court in Bridget Kaseka & Others v Republic,
154
 where the Police had 
arrested and prosecuted women suspected of being prostitutes while allowing their male partners 
to go free.   
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The same could be applied when one looks at the manner in which section 153 (b) and (c) have 
been utilized by law enforcers.  The police will only arrest males suspected to have consensually 
committed anal sex and not a male and female suspected to have committed the same. Where 
one is brought before the criminal justice system in cases of male to female anal sex encounter, it 
is when consent is lacking and the preferred charge is usually indecent assault and not sodomy.  
Reverting to the case involving Tionge and Steven, it can be noted that the two men were 
brought before the criminal justice system because they were men who had anal sex. They were 
prosecuted and convicted not solely because they committed anal sex but also due to the fact that 
they were men. Sex or gender becomes one characteristic of the offence envisaged in section 153 
(a) and (c) of the Penal Code when it comes to its practical application thereof. This is against 
the spirit of section 20 (1) of the Constitution which guarantees the right to equality and effective 
protection under the law.  In Malawi Congress Party & Others v Attorney General & Another 
the equality provision in section 20 (1) was utilized to hold that the legislature had a duty to 
enact laws that are neutral and do not target particular individuals. Justice Mwaungulu said: 
Under the equality before the law provisions of our Constitution, laws that are promulgated by our national 
Parliament must be directed to all in [a] class.  Short of that, they will be attacked for discrimination.  Laws 
which are promulgated against one individual are likely to be disqualified as vindictive and implying 




Section 20 (1) is a prohibition of discrimination in law and fact.  This was emphasized in the 
case of Republic v Chinthiti and Others
156
 where it was held that equality under the law does not 
require mere formal or mathematical equality, but a substantial and genuine equality in fact.   
From the foregoing, it is hereby argued that in reality, section 153 (a) and (c) is blatantly 
discriminatory on grounds of sex by subjecting men to unequal treatment before the law. 
 
  
                                                          
155
 (note 89 above)  
156












3.5.3 The discrimination ground on “sex” to be read in “sexual orientation” 
On the other hand, relating section 153 (a) and (c) to  discrimination based on sex, the contention 
would be that the word “sex” in section 20 (1) must be read expansively to include prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation as the prohibited ground of sex discrimination 
cannot be read as applying to gender simpliciter. 
 
The ICCPR in article 2 recognises the right to equality and states that „the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination on the grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political and other 
opinion, national or social region, property birth or other status‟  In Toonen v Australia
157
 the 
Human Rights Committee while holding that certain provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
which criminalise various forms of sexual conduct between men violated the ICCPR, observed 
that the reference to “sex” in article 2, paragraphs 1 and  26 is to be taken to include sexual 
orientation.  In Canada, despite the fact that section 5 (10) of the Canadian Charter does not 
expressly include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that sexual orientation is a ground analogous to those that are listed in section 20 
(1) of the Constitution of Malawi.
158
   
 
The same reasoning is evident in the European Court of Human Rights where “sexual 
orientation” does not feature in the European Convention of Human Rights but the court made a 
finding that the Convention does provide protection for gays in particular.
159
  Adopting the 
interpretive inclusion of sexual orientation within the ground of “sex” in section 20 (1) of the 
Constitution and in addition to paying due regard to the norms of international jurisprudence and 
comparable foreign case law, it follows that homosexuals fall within the protected scope of the 
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Constitution.  Hence a law like that of section 153 (a) and (c) discriminates on the basis of one‟s 
sexual preference is unconstitutional. 
 
It is noteworthy that a challenge on this basis might be highly contentious due to the fact that the 
provision as it is covers perpetrators who are either heterosexual or homosexual. However, it is 
very important to note that the test of whether a provision is discriminatory or not should not 
only be limited to the word by word assessment of the law as it is drafted in Penal Code.  A lot of 




 observed that discrimination does not occur in the abstract areas of the law, 
hermetically sealed from one another, where each aspect of discrimination is to be examined as it 
is and its impact assessed in isolation. He argued that we must understand discrimination in 
context of the experience of persons on whom it impacts.   
In assessing the impact of the discriminatory nature of section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code, 
an examination on how the perpetrators in Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga 
Kachepa were treated is of relevance.  Steven and Tionge found themselves in conflict with 
section 153 (a) and (c) because of their sex, that is, by reason of them being males. They were 
arrested because they were males who conducted a traditional engagement which has the same 
status as a valid marriage in the Malawian laws.  Had it been that the traditional engagement was 
between a man and woman, there would have been no arrest.  The lawfulness of arrest was based 
on section 153 (a) and (c) in that by reason of them being traditionally married, they must have 
consummated the marriage through anal sex which is a crime against the order of nature.   
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It is worth noting that the Court unequivocally held that in Malawi the bizarre marriage of the 
two men cannot be equated to the normal practice of any other lawful marriage.
161
  The Court 
was also quick to point that Malawi was not ready to see its sons getting married to other sons or 
conducting engagement ceremonies.  The distinction is in the fact that a marriage between man 
and woman is lawful and the provision would not be invoked on the basis that the respective man 
and woman might be having sex against the order nature.  But where there is a same sex union, 
then the law fits squarely. Consequently, sexual intercourse between a man and a woman is the 
norm.  On the other hand, sexual intercourse between males is shocking, sinful and unlawful.   
Therefore, in practice, the provision differentiates the lawfulness of sexual intercourse by reason 
of one being of the same sex or different sex. 
It was observed by Ackerman J that in assessing the impact of discrimination which has a 
bearing on the fairness and unfairness of the discrimination, the following factors though not 
exhaustive should be considered: 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past from patterns of 
disadvantage; 
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.  If its purpose is 
manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the complainants in their fundamental human 
dignity or in a comparably serious respect, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal, 
such as for example, the furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the 
particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether the complainants have in fact suffered 
the impairment in question. 
(c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an impairment 
of their fundamental dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparable serious nature.
162
 
As shown in the analysis of the case of Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa, 
section 153 (a) and (c) reinforces already existing social prejudices on men who have sex with 
fellow men.  The provision ends up giving homosexuals a subhuman status and encourages 
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stigma of such men.  This can be observed in the public perceptions as reported in the Malawi 
media and the judgment in Steven and Tionge‟s case.  The threats of impeding arrests from the 
government and the police instill fear and vulnerability amongst homosexuals.  Being a 
disadvantaged and minority group, their solace remains in the Constitution for protection of their 
fundamental rights.  It is trite that the more vulnerable the group adversely affected by the 
discrimination, the more likely the discrimination would be held to be unfair.
163
 
3.5.4 Violation of the right to privacy 
Section 21 (1) (a) of the Constitution provides for the right to privacy as follows: 
„ Every person shall have the right to personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to 
searches of his or her person, home and property.‟   
The right to privacy is a hallmark of a free society founded on the respect for human dignity.
164
 It 
is the right to be left alone and has been described as the most comprehensive right and the most 
valued by civilized men.
165
  It guarantees autonomy over the self and moral integrity of an 
individual. At the very minimum, the right to privacy protects the inner core or sanctum of the 
person.
166
  This right is also about how an individual exercises his or her freedom by making 
personal choices relating to one‟s identity, personality and lifestyle.   
The State is obliged to uphold the right to privacy and at the same time should avoid interference 
with people‟s bodies and homes, whether they are homosexuals or not.  Private life has been held 
to include sexual life
167
 and should as well cover homosexual conduct between consenting 
adults. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, the South 
African Constitutional Court said: 
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Privacy recognizes that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to 
establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside community.  … If, in 
expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that precinct 
will be a breach of or privacy.
168
 
The right to privacy encompasses the freedom from interference with the sphere of private 
activity, in which an individual can indulge and explore their own tastes and preferences in their 
sexuality without any state interference.  
The implementation of the law in Section 153 (a) and (c) subjects accused persons to unjustified 
searches of their body.  It is a clear cut hindrance to an individual‟s freedom of choice relating to 
personality and lifestyle in that person who elects to express his sexuality through consensual 
sodomy activities is deemed to be in conflict with the law.  This is a clear cut intrusion of a 
person sexual life which in these circumstances should be protected under the rubric of privacy.  
Consensual sodomy between adults does not in any way cause harm to warrant such an invasion 
of privacy. 
3.5.5 Privacy as contextualized in the right to dignity 
It has been contended that it would be treading on dangerous grounds one rely on the right to 
privacy when challenging sodomy laws.
169
  This is so because arguing on the privacy claim, one 
inadvertently reinforces societal norms that consensual sodomy or homosexual conduct should 
be hidden from the public forum, as it is a private matter and an embarrassment to the litigation 
process.
170
 The privacy ground has the potential of suppressing debate on sexual orientation even 
in court, since it encourages the culture of silence where coming out and publicity would be vital 
tools in challenging sodomy laws. Not undermining a challenge on the constitutionality of 
section 153 (a) and (c) on the ground of privacy,
171
 but when privacy is properly contextualized 
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it can be fused with dignity and form a powerful ground which is firmly protected by the 
Constitution. 
3.5.6 The right to dignity 
Section 19 (1) of the Constitution states that: „The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.‟ This 
unlimited constitutional protection of dignity requires one to acknowledge the value and worth of 
all members of the society.  The decision in Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case of 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice
172
, noted that 
there is a link between the rights of dignity and privacy.  Privacy encompasses the inner core of 
an individual like family life, sexual preference and the home environment.
173
  The way we give 
meaning to our sexuality is at the core of our being in the area of private intimacy.
174
  No aspect 
of a person‟s life may be said to be more private or intimate than that of sexual relations. And 
since private, consensual, sexual preferences figure prominently within the individual‟s dignity 
and personality, they are an inalienable component of the right to dignity. 
Section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code prohibits all sexual intercourse per anus between males 
regardless of the whether there is consent or not.  As has already been outlined, this provision 
punishes a form of sexual conduct identified by homosexuals.  This leads to arrests of men who 
are presumed to be having sexual intercourse per anus. The infringement of the right to privacy 
and dignity is more evident because of the difficulty that arises in finding evidence where the 
sexual act was consensual which most of the times is done in private.  Hence the enforcement of 
section 153 (a) and (c) leads to the invasion of the intimate private lives of homosexuals.  A 
practical example is what happened in the case of Steven and Tionge.  The two men were 
subjected to mortifying conduct during the investigation of their case and throughout the trial 
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process. The psychiatric assessment to determine the soundness of their minds, the gender 
examination establishing whether they were male of female and the gynecologist‟s examination 
to find out if there were traces of semen in their anal areas; are clear cut cases of a violation of a 
person‟s privacy and dignity. 
It should be borne in mind that physical and moral integrity is an integral part of the right dignity 
and privacy.  The right to privacy prohibits the subjection of individuals to medical or scientific 
experimentation without their consent.
175
  This element is listed as an aspect of the right to 
dignity in some international instruments.
176
 This example provides an idea on how the existence 
of a law that prohibits sexual intercourse per anus between males is bound to degrade the person 
and dignity of homosexuals as well as breach their right to privacy. In overruling the well known 
case of Bowers v Hardwick,
177
 the Supreme Court of the United States explained the general 
effect of anti sodomy laws in Lawrence v Texas as follows: 
Although the laws involved in Bowers and here purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, 
their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.  They seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to 
choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their private lives 
and still retain their dignity as free persons.
178
 
The above ruling further confirms the proposition that an invasion to one‟s sexual preference 
goes beyond an infringement to the right to privacy.  It has the effect of invading a person‟s 
sense of being.  An individual preference of sodomy without aggression, force, violence or abuse 
is a legitimate exercise of his autonomy to that preferred sexual behavior and should be 
respected. 
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It is in this light that it is hereby contended that the prohibition of consensual sexual relations in 
section 153 (a) and (c) abridges a person‟s privacy in the context of the right to dignity. 
3.6 Are the infringements justifiable? 
It is a common feature of human rights protection jurisprudence that only a few rights are 
absolute. Restriction or limitations on human rights are indeed recognized.  Under the 
Constitution this is provided for in section 44.  Section 44 (1) (g) outlines the non derogable 
rights. Among them is the right to equality and recognition before the law.  In addition, 
according to section 19 (1) the right to dignity is inviolable.  The crux of the argument is that the 
net effect of the impugned Penal Code provision is the denial of the right to equality and 
recognition before the law.  These rights being non-derogable cannot therefore be subjected to 
the limitation test under section 44 (2).  Nevertheless, it remains important to take note that even 
if for instance, it can be argued that the right to equality is limitless, the inquiry on a finding of 
discrimination entails justifying differential treatment.
179
  In essence, this is the same as going 
through the test of limitation of rights. 
Section 44 (2) and (3) of the Constitution provides that a limitation must: 
a) be prescribed by law 
It is trite that a limitation on a constitutional right must be prescribed by law as a measure 
against impromptu and arbitrary limitations. In the present case, it is clear that the 
limitation in section 153 is prescribed by law. 
b) be reasonable 
Reasonableness in this regard demands that a limitation on rights must be sensibly 
connected to its stated objectives. This is confirmed in Maggie Kaunda v Republic
180
 
where it was held that reasonableness calls for the proportionality inquiry between the 
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limitation and the aim sought by it.
181
  This means that, the limitation must not only be 
capable of achieving the objective sought but also that it must not infringe on human 
rights more that necessary to achieve that objective.
182
 
The purpose of section 153 (a) and (c) is to arrest and prosecute those persons alleged to 
have committed sex against the order of nature. Consent is irrelevant. This objective was 
an important one and made sense back then when the basis for criminalizing carnal 
knowledge against the order of nature was that it was an abominable sin.  The rationale 
behind the section is a presumed belief that sex against the order of nature is immoral or 
unacceptable. Analysing this assertion closely, it is evident that morality does not 
sufficiently justify section 153 regulation of homosexual sodomy.  The legislature or 
State‟s justification for the provision was without doubt grounded in religion than 
morality.  A state can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance 
than it can punish such behavior for racial animus.
183
  It is not logical in this era to 
promote such an objective between consenting adults to anal sex.  It has already been 
elaborated that in the advancement of the objective that section 153 (a) and (c) seek to 
achieve, the accused person‟s rights to equality, privacy and dignity are infringed.  In 
addition, since the scope of section 153 (a) and (c) is quite broad it ends up impinging on 
the mentioned rights more than necessary.  In this regard, section 153 fails the 
proportionality test. 
c) be recognised by international human rights standards 
This requisite serves as an external check on the validity of a law limiting a right.  A 
State should show that the limitation is recognized in international law and most 
democratic states. Evidence that the limitation is rarely found in comparative human 
rights law will cast doubt as to its necessity.
184
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Limiting a person‟s right to dignity, privacy and equality for the sake of curbing sodomy 
cannot stand the wrath of international human rights standards.  This is evidenced by the 
protection of minority rights in various regional human rights instruments and the 
pronouncements made by international human rights courts on the matter. 
d) be of general application 
The principle behind this requirement is that any law must apply impersonally, that is, it 
must apply to everyone equally and must not target specific persons.
185
  Selective 
application of laws results into arbitrary and unjust action. The Court in the American 
case of Railway Express Agency v New York said: 
…, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and 
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution 
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.
186
 
Section 153 (a) and (c) may appear to apply to any person however it is widely accepted 
that in practice the provision prohibits homosexual conduct between consenting adults.  
This law specifically targets males who commit anal sex. Homosexuals are arrested and 
prosecuted for consensual sodomy while heterosexuals are not.  There is differential 
treatment between homosexuals and heterosexuals. The selective approach that this law is 
being used results into unjustified discrimination, invasion of privacy in intimate relations 
and demeaning conduct subjected to consenting adult males. 
e) be necessary in an open and democratic society 
This demands that the limitation must serve a legitimate purpose necessary in an open 
and democratic society.  The Malawian courts have held that this measure calls upon a 
consideration on whether a limitation promotes fundamental principles of the 
Constitution or principles of national policy.
187
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The Constitution of Malawi lists the rights to equality and dignity as inviolable.  On one 
hand, this denotes the importance placed on these rights against other rights. On the other 
hand, the presumption would be that an abridgement of the said rights should be very 
necessary as it would be against the foundational principles of the constitution.  
Even if the said rights were said to be limited, which is clearly not the case, it is 
submitted that the limitations on the right to equality, dignity and privacy imposed by the 
existence of section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code are unreasonable, not recognized 
by international human rights standards and not necessary in an open and democratic 
society. 
f) not negate the essential content of the right or freedom in question 
A law should not negate the essential components of a right.  In cases where a limitation 
negatively affects the core of a given right or abrogates the whole right, it is doubtful that 
a court will be uphold it.
188
 
Section 153 (a) and (c) negate the very essence of the rights to equality, dignity and 
privacy.  This is due to the fact that firstly, it creates differential treatment before the law 
between homosexuals, heterosexuals, males and females in that the law will basically 
punish anal sex between males only.  Secondly, it allows the State to arbitrarily invade 
the privacy of consenting adults in intimate activities. If sexual conduct between a 
consenting male and female is regarded as private and protected, what then would be the 
justification for limiting the right to privacy of consenting males conducting the same 
activities?  Thirdly, because investigation and prosecution of sodomy cases between 
consenting males is generally difficult in as far as evidence is concerned, accused persons 
are subjected to very inhuman and degrading treatment in a manner that pays less regard 
to the sense of worth. Hence, in fulfilling the objective of section 153 (a) and (c), the 
dignity of persons caught by that provision is massively abridged.  This destroys the very 
essence of the right to dignity. 
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This chapter has analysed the constitutionality of the provision. It is without doubt that section 
153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code substantively relates to the interpretation or application of the 
Constitution.  It has been established that the section infringes on the rights to equality, dignity 
and privacy.  Section 153 (a) and (c) is, therefore, unconstitutional.  Is the constitutional 
challenge on the provision as simple as it sounds on paper? What are the challenges and 
prospects if any of declaring the invalidity of the provision? What would be the appropriate 
remedy? Can the provision be amended in order to bring it in line with the Constitution? Or 























THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS TO THE DECRIMINALISATION OF 
CONSENSUAL SODOMY IN MALAWI  
4. 1 Introduction 
It has been argued in the preceding chapter that section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code is 
unconstitutional as it infringes on the right to equality, dignity and privacy.  The contention that 
anti sodomy laws violate human rights principles is beyond doubt and widely accepted by a lot 
of democratic states and international human rights organizations. What remains a challenge for 
countries like Malawi is the probability of declaring such a law by the Courts as unconstitutional.  
This chapter will highlight some of the challenges that might be faced in bringing the 
constitutionality test of section 153 (a) and (c) and how notwithstanding such challenges, there 
are still prospects to do so. 
4.2 The challenges 
4.2.1 The Chief Justice‟s certification of the constitutionality of a matter 
For every matter relating to the application or interpretation of the Constitution, leave has to be 
sought from the Chief Justice of Malawi.  The Chief Justice has the mandate to certify whether 
an issue is fit to be heard by the Constitutional Court.   This serves as a major impediment in 
intricate matters like the constitutionality of anti sodomy laws where preconceived notions and 
other political influences come into play.   
For instance, in Malawi, the Chief Justice is appointed by the President and confirmed by a 
majority of two thirds of members present in a voting session.
189
  The Chief Justice‟s 
appointment is neither based on a recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission as is the 
case with the appointment of other judges nor based on a rigorous assessment of his credibility or 
competence. This provides lee way for purely political appointments whose honorable candidates 
may at times want to please their appointee when faced with certain highly contentious matters. 
                                                          
189












This assertion can be inferred in the manner in which the Chief Justice dealt with the case of 
Steven and Tionge.  The application for leave to have Steven and Tionge‟s case heard by a 
Constitutional Court came at a time when the Malawi head of state had made pronouncements 
that he would not allow abolishment of anti sodomy laws during his tenure.  He further referred 
to men who have sex with fellow men as demons and stated that such conduct should not be 
legalised in Malawi.  When one looks at the  ruling  dismissing the application to certify section 
153 of the Penal Code as raising constitutional issues, it simply states that the matter does not 
raise any issues requiring the application or interpretation of the Constitution.  This is baffling 
bearing in mind that it is trite that anti sodomy laws and human rights are closely intertwined and 
do not need special lenses to deduce their linkage.  Hence, the presumption that granting the 
powers of certification on the constitutionality of a highly contentious law like section 153 to a 
single judge, opens the whole process to  personal biases, political or other influences. 
4.2.2 The set up of the Constitutional Court 
Malawi does not have a permanent Constitutional Court per se.  It has a High Court which sits as 
a Constitutional Court at an appointed time.  After the Chief Justice‟s certification that a given 
matter raises issues related to the Constitution, he appoints at least three High Court judges to sit 
as a constitutional court.
190
  The Chief Justice is at liberty to appoint any judge to preside over a 
constitutional matter.  What this means is that, presumably, the Chief Justice may decide to 
appoint those judges whom he knows would surely conform to the same views as his or to the 
source of political influence if at all there is any.  This would have probably happened with the 
case of Steven and Tionge had it been certified. Taking into account the anti sodomy attitude of 
the President of Malawi, the executive branch of government, the Church, media, the general 
public and the criminal justice system itself, apart from giving a lame excuse for dismissing the 
application, the Chief Justice would have just appointed judges who are homophobic.   
As far fetched as this proposition might seem,  if analysed critically it is evident that the current 
set of appointing judges to sit as a Constitutional Court in the above mentioned manner poses a 
great threat for matters that do infringe on rights of the minority. 
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4.2.3 The locus standi requirement in constitutional matters 
Locus standi may be defined as the existence of a right of an individual or a group of individuals 
to have a court adjudicate upon an issue brought before it by the individual or group.
191
  Two 
constitutional provisions are relevant to this point. Section 15 (2) of the Constitution provides as 
follows: 
Any person or group of persons with sufficient interest in the protection and the enforcement of rights 
under this Chapter shall be entitled to the assistance of the courts, the Ombudsman, the human rights 
commission and other organs of Government to ensure the promotion, protection and redress of grievance 
in respect of those rights.   
The second provision in section 46 (2), is couched in the following manner: 
Any person who claims that a fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by this Constitution has been 
infringed or threatened shall be entitled- 
(a) to make application t a competent court to enforce or protect such a right or freedom; and 
(b) to make application to the Ombudsman or the Human Rights Commission in order to secure such 
assistance or advice as he or she may reasonably require 
United Democratic Front (UDF) v Attorney General
192
 was the first case which interpreted the 
above provisions.  It held that the according to the mentioned constitutional provisions, the court 
will only enforce the performance of a statutory duty on the application of a person who can 
show that he himself has a legal right to insist on the performance of that duty.
193
  It is important 
to note that, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal has constantly referred to it with approval.
194
  
Therefore, as far as the issue on locus standi is concerned, the law is that an individual must 
establish a personal interest or substantial interest over and above that of other citizens in order 
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to have sufficient standing to commence an action related to the protection or enforcement of 
human rights. 
With the locus standi requisite in mind, it is worth mentioning that a challenge to the 
constitutionality of section 153 (a) and (c) should be done by a litigant who must possess 
sufficient interest and demonstrate that the provision adversely affects his or her rights or 
interests. The case of Steven and Tionge presented one great opportunity where the constitutional 
validity of section 153 (a) and (c) could have been tested by the Malawi Constitutional Court.  
Steven and Tionge would have had sufficient interest to commence a constitutional matter before 
the Court.  Unfortunately, this important opportunity was thwarted by the Chief Justice‟s non 
certification of the matter. The case not only exposed the worst side of Malawi‟s criminal justice 
system towards homosexuality but it has also uncovered a very hostile environment which the 
public has created towards people who openly disclose their homosexual conduct.  
 In the mean time, it is quite unlikely that any person or individuals who might be affected by the 
criminalization of consensual sodomy between adults would come out in the open and 
commence an action to test the constitutionality of the provision.  This, coupled with the 
requirement for sufficient standing in a matter, is another obstacle to the constitutional scrutiny 
of section 153 (a) and (c).  Had it not been for the requisite to demonstrate enough standing, the 
proscription in section 153 (a) and (c) would have been brought before the Court through public 
interest litigation
195
 or by some human rights organizations who had openly expressed their 
discontent with the provision.  
4.2.4 Malawi‟s general consensus that homosexuality is immoral and a sin 
As highlighted in chapter two, the criminalization of sexual conduct against the order of nature is 
based on a biblical understanding that sodomy is a religious abomination and immoral.  The 
early church held the view that sodomy was against God‟s ordinance of nature and should be 
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given a stiff punishment.
196
  Malawi has close to 80 percent
197
 of its citizens as Christians who 
are persuaded by virtue of their Christian doctrine to subscribe to the same view.  They hold the 
view that homosexuality or consensual sodomy is a perverted practice which must be eradicated 
from society.
198
  It is considered as a mental disease to be cured by psychiatrists or divine 
intervention.  In some sectors it is likened to bestiality.
199
   
The theological point of view equates consensual sodomy to Sodom and Gomorra, territories 
which the Bible refers to as infested with evil.
200
 This mind-set towards sodomy has infiltrated a 
greater section of the Malawi Christian church.  During the time when Steven and Tionge were 
being tried for sodomy, the Malawi Council of Churches, which is a representative council of all 
christian churches in Malawi, issued a press statement on the churches‟ view on homosexual 
conduct.  It stated that those who commit sodomy commit a sin before God.
201
 The Council 
further stated that homosexual conduct is evil and must not be condoned by the Malawian 
society.  In addition, it advised the Malawi government to retain current laws against 
homosexuality in the criminal code and to disregard the pressure from donor countries.  The 
Council advised the countries to respect Malawi‟s cultural and religious values and refrain from 
using aid as a means of forcing the country to legalise sinful acts like homosexuality in the name 
of human rights. 
The Church in Malawi has a very significant impact on instigation to change oppressive laws, 
poor governance and lack of the rule of law in the country.  For example, it was through a 
pastoral letter issued by the Church in 1994 that the change from 30 years of dictatorship to a 
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multiparty system was ignited.
202
  It is the same Church that issued several press statements in 
2003 urging citizens to peacefully protest against the then government‟s proposal to increase the 
constitutional two years presidential term of office to three years.
203
  The trend has been that 
when the church makes a stand on a topical issue, the populace usually sees sense in it and 
obediently adopts the Church‟s view. Therefore, it is not surprising that most Malawians are 
homophobic and consequently, it would take the bravest of all to come out in the open and 
challenge the consensual sodomy provision. 
4.3 The prospects 
4.3.1 The role of international law in protecting sexual minority rights 
The interpretive value of jurisprudence from the international and regional human rights systems 
is given recognition in a number of provisions of the Constitution.
204
  For instance, section 13 (k) 
of the Constitution directs the State to govern in accordance with the law of nations.  Besides, 
section 44 (2) states that laws that limit constitutional rights must be recognized by international 
human rights standards.   Further, where applicable, a court is to have regard to current norms of 
public international law and comparable case law when interpreting provisions of the 
Constitution.
205
  Furthermore, apart from serving as an interpretive aid in constitutional 
interpretation, international law is a source of law in Malawi.   These provisions make it 
justifiable for the courts to draw insights from international law when interpreting constitutional 
rights.
206
 This means that a court can hold the State responsible for violating a right that is not 
specifically provided for in the Constitution.  For example, by applying the Human Rights 
Committee decision in Toonen v Australia,
207
 the Malawi Courts can find section 153 (a) and (c) 
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discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation even if that specific ground is not provided for 
in the Constitution.  
In addition, by virtue of being a party to a treaty, a state must implement the provisions of the 
covenant in a domestic setting.  This also entails compliance with decisions made by monitoring 
bodies to reflect a state‟s respect of its international obligations.  In this light, the jurisprudence 
of the Human rights committee in upholding sexual minority rights should be respected and 
implemented by Malawi as it is a party to the ICCPR.  The ICCPR forms part of the law of 
Malawi and can be enforced in the domestic courts.  The role that the ICCPR and international 
law generally can play in challenging the anti sodomy provision cannot be underestimated.  It 
legitimizes the constitutional challenge in a country like Malawi where there is a minute record 
of human rights litigation. 
4.3.2 Pressure from the international community to promote minority rights 
The trial and conviction of Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa on sodomy 
awakened Malawi to the fact that the international community has an eagle eye‟s view on the 
State‟s protection and promotion of minority rights.  This can be observed in that Malawi came 
under pressure when the court convicted and sentenced Steven and Tionge to 14 years 
imprisonment.  
The then United Nations Human Rights Chief, Navi Pillay slammed the jailing of the gay couple 
and stated that it set an alarming precedent.
208
  She said the law which enabled the conviction 
dates back to the colonial era and had been dormant for a number of years, rightly so because it 
is discriminatory and has the effect of criminalizing individuals based on perceptions of their 
identity.
209
  Pillay urged that the conviction be quashed and the anti sodomy provision 
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 She further remarked that such a law was in violation of a number of key human 
rights treaties of which Malawi was a party to.
211
 
Amnesty international reacted with condemnation as did donor entities like the African 
Development Bank, European Union and the World Bank.
212
 Several countries, among others, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Africa
213
 also condemned Malawi‟s attitude towards 
homosexuality. They all called for the release of the two men and reform of the penal provision 
criminalizing consensual sodomy. 
Most important of all was the intervention by the then United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki- 
Moon in May 2010.
214
  He paid a visit to Malawi a few days after the conviction of Steven and 
Tionge and had talks with the Head of State, Bingu wa Muntharika.
215
  After this meeting, 
President Muntharika granted a presidential pardon to the two men.
216
 His sentiments made after 
granting the presidential pardon indicate that he was not amused with the release of Steven and 
Tionge but was compelled due to the pressure mounted on him by the UN secretary general.
217
 
Since the trial of Steven and Tionge on sodomy, the Malawi government has been receiving 
donor pressure to respect rights of minority groups.
218
  This has prompted the Ministry of Justice 
to refer section 153 of the Penal Code which outlaws consensual sodomy to the Malawi Law 
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   The review of the law comes at a time when two of Malawi‟s major 
donors, Britain and the United States of America have threatened that they would use the 
financial assistance it renders to the country as a means to push for the rights of minorities like 
homosexuals.
220
  This is a major step for Malawi in what could be a possible repeal of the anti 
sodomy law. 
4.3.3 Threat of losing the fight against HIV/AIDS 
Malawi continues to experience a severe HIV epidemic.
221
   Out of a population of 12 million 
people, 1 million people are living with HIV.
222
  The government and international donors have 
put in place a comprehensive response to the epidemic in recent years.
223
 Men who have sex with 
other men or commit consensual sodomy are a well known high-risk group with a very high 
incidence.
224
  Data from a study which used a snow ball sampling method identified 200 men 




The National HIV/AIDS Strategy states that Government and partners shall put in place 
mechanisms to ensure that HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support and impact 
mitigation services can be accessed by all without discrimination.
226
  „Without discrimination‟ 
implies that persons engaged in same sex sexual relations are to be included.  The Malawi 
Secretary for Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the President‟s Office, Dr Mary Shawa, acknowledged 
the need to incorporate a human rights approach in the delivery of HIV and AIDS services to 
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men who have sexual intercourse with men.
227
  She said Malawi must recognize the rights of its 
gay population in order to fully step up the fight against AIDS.
228
 She further asked men who 
have sex with men to come out in the open in order to assist in HIV prevention efforts.
229
  This 
cannot be done given the statements made by governmental officials and other members of the 
public denouncing sex between men, which has served to further drive this already vulnerable 
community further underground. 
The importance of reaching out to persons having same-sex relations as a critical component of 
the response to HIV has been well-recognised by leading medical institutions as well as 
UNAIDS, UNDP and the World Health Organisation.
230
 . An effective response to HIV/AIDS 
requires improved strategic information about all risk groups, including men who have sex with 
other men.  
The criminalization of sodomy which in true sense makes homosexuality illegal is the primary 
setback to the Malawi government‟s goal of preventing and managing HIV/AIDS on all high risk 
groups.  It is believed that the inclusion of interventions on how the government of Malawi will 
address and manage HIV and AIDS in the high risk but minority group is one of the core reasons 
why the Global fund rejected Malawi‟s proposal for Round 10 funding on preventive and 
management of HIV/AIDS for men who have sex with other men considering that 
homosexuality is illegal in the country. 
231 Reports indicate that Malawi‟s proposal was rejected 
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The proscription on consensual sodomy is not only a legal, but a structural and social barrier to 
the national and international commitment to the fight against HIV/AIDS across the board.  
Malawi would not be able to effectively fight the virus without giving gays access to HIV/AID 
services.
233
  This is so because most men who have sex with other men in Malawi have female 
sexual partners as well, hence increasing the likelihood of HIV transmission to their female 
partners. 
234
 Thus, from the statements made by the Secretary for HIV/AIDS and Nutrition, the 
government of Malawi is fully aware that it is imperative that interventions aimed at curbing 
HIV/AIDS must target men who commit consensual sodomy.  The dilemma created between 
condoning the impugned sodomy provision and the threat to losing the fight against HIV/AIDS 
will definitely lean on the possibility of a reform on section 153 of the Penal Code. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The challenges that could be encountered in the process of declaring section 153 (a) and (c) 
unconstitutional are daunting.  However, despite these challenges, the chapter has highlighted 
that; firstly, the Malawi courts can resort to international law in interpreting the rights enshrined 
in the Constitution.  Secondly and lastly, pressure from the international community and the 
threat to losing the fight against HIV/AIDS, provide an opportunity for law reform on the 
provision. What would be the appropriate law reform for section 153 (a) and (c)? Can the 
provision be amended in order to bring it in line with the Constitution? Or should it totally be 
deleted from the Penal Code? These questions are considered in the next chapter. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The fact that section 153 (a) and (c) is unconstitutional because it trumps upon the rights to 
equality, dignity and privacy is no understatement.  Even though comparable international 
human rights law, the international community and the commitment to curb HIV/AIDS might 
have a critical role to play in the reform of this law, what remains as a fact is that the strongest 
possibility for sodomy law reform rests with Malawi‟s legislature and the courts. The questions 
that arise in the event of a law reform are; should section 153 (a) and (c) be deleted completely 
from the penal code? Or should the sodomy provision be retained with slight amendments?  I 
consider these issues in this chapter and make recommendations on the way forward. 
5.2 Should it be a case of partial amendment? 
The legislature is empowered to enact laws.
235
  It thus has powers to amend section 153 (a) and 
(c) as long as such an amendment is consistent with the Constitution.
236
  In the fulfillment of this 
mandate, the legislature is under an obligation. The most likely law reform for section 153 (a) 
and (c) that Malawi would attempt, would be an amendment by substitution. 
5.2.1 Deleting the word „male person‟ from Malawi‟s anti sodomy provision and 
substituting it with „any person‟ 
The penal code of Botswana had a similar provision to section 153 (a) and (c).  Prior to its 
amendment, its section 164 read: 
 Any person who has- 
(a) carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; 
(b) … 
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(c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty of 
an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years. 
In 1998, the above provision was amended.  It now reads as follows: 
 Any person who has- 
(a) carnal knowledge against the order of nature 
(b) … 
(c) permits any other person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty 
of an offence… 
The above provisions came under constitutionality test in the case of Kanene v State.
237
 The 
appellant, an adult male had been charged with committing an unnatural offence contrary to 
section 164 (c) of the Botswana penal code, prior to its amendment.
238
  He pleaded not guilty 
arguing that the section was ultra vires section 3 of the Constitution of Botswana providing for, 
among others, non discrimination, right to privacy.
239
  The appeal took place after the provision 
was amended.  Counsel for the appellant argued that the fact that the offender in the pre amended 
section 164 (c), in committing the offence, permitted only a male person and not a female to 
have carnal knowledge of him or her was discriminatory.
240
  More importantly, he contended that 
the whole section 164 in its pre and post amendment was discriminatory.
241
  He said it subjected 




In its judgment, the Constitutional Court considered section 164 prior to its amendment and after 
it was amended. It observed that it became readily apparent from the amendment that the 
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legislature widened the scope of section 164 (c) by changing the person who the offender permits 
to have carnal knowledge of him or her from a „male person‟ to „any person‟.
243
  The Court 
applauded the broader scope of section 164 and confirmed that the wide scope made the law 
even more non discriminatory.  In other words, it did not infringe on the right not to be 
discriminated against. All in all, it held that both the pre and post amended section 164 were not 
unconstitutional. 
The court‟s justification for holding that section 164 does not target a specific group of people, 
that is those who engage in homosexual conduct is rather disheartening and serve as bad 
precedent for other African nations who still have the anti sodomy provision.  As has been 
discussed in the preceding chapters, the issue is not mainly about the plain reading of the anti 
sodomy law as envisaged in the section 153 (a) and (c) of the Malawi penal code.  A plain 
reading of the law reveals little and is very ambiguous.  Its unjustified violation to the rights of 
equality, dignity and privacy are clearer upon the practical operation of the provision. Thus, even 
if it is amended in such a manner, and not mention homosexual or heterosexual, lesbian or gay, 
the law would still be infringing on the rights of a specific group of people.  The ambiguity is 
further widened when the provision is amended by substituting „any man‟ with „any person‟. On 
the surface of it will appear to penalize whoever but in reality it will be taegeting homosexual or 
lesbian conduct. 
For instance, in Sri Lanka, the word „person‟ was used to replace „man‟ resulting into legislation 
that criminalises both men and women for same sex sexual activity.
244
  It was noted that the 
introduction of a bill aimed at decriminalizing homosexual conduct between men, ultimately 
resulted in extending the scope of the original law.
245
 In addition, this meant that women in same 
sex unions would also come under the law.
246
 Such an amendment does not provide a cure to the 
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condemned law on consensual sodomy rather it brings in another minority group to the harsh and 
unjustified application of this law.
247
 
From the foregoing, a partial amendment of section 153 is as oppressive to minority rights as the 
original provision and should not be an option.   
5.3 The appropriate remedy     
The Court has the power of declaring a law invalid if it is inconsistent with the Constitution of 
Malawi 
248
and interpret it in a manner that is in line with the Constitution,
249
  or make any other 
appropriate remedy.
250
 An appropriate remedy is determined according to the extent to which a 
law infringes on a right or rights. When an infringement fails the constitutionality test, a 
declaration that the provision is invalid in its entirety is likely to ensue.  Therefore, this should be 
the measure to be applied to the infringements occasioned by section 153 (a) and (c).  
As noted in chapter three, firstly, the discriminatory effect in section 153 (a) and (c) is unjustified 
in any democratic society.  Discrimination caused by criminalisation of consensual sodomy is 
unreasonable and negates the very essence of the right to equality.
251
  It arbitrarily targets 
homosexuals who are already a disfavoured minority group.     
Secondly, the impugned law unlawfully interferes with a person‟s right to privacy.  The 
infringement caused by section 153 (a) and (c) on the right to privacy is not proportional to the 
end sought or purpose the limitation seeks to achieve. Consensual sexual conduct between adults 
is a private matter in which the state need not interfere.
252
  Issues of private intimacy and one‟s 
sexuality are closely intertwined with an individual‟s autonomy and dignity.
253
  However, as 
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noted implementation of the provision, results into arbitrary searches on the body person 
suspected to have committed sodomy.  The individual is subjected to unjustified degrading 
treatment and forced to undergo embarrassing medical and psychological tests.  
From the above, it is, hereby submitted that section 153 (a) and (c) cannot be interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with the constitution.  As a result, this defect cannot be rectified with 
any amendment.  After all, doing so will only create a more ambiguous offence that will target 
both homosexuals and lesbians.  It thus follows that, Section 153 (a) and (c) should be deleted 
from the penal code.  Ultimately, the conduct punishable under the provision should be 
decriminalized. 
5.4 Summary of findings  
This paper sought to critique the criminalisation of consensual sodomy in Malawi.  Firstly, it 
reckoned in chapter two that there are apparent ambiguities created by section 153 (a) and (c) of 
the Penal Code.  These ambiguities fault the principle against doubtful penalisation. 
Secondly, by way of a case study of Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimabalanga 
Kachepa,
254
 the study has shown that section 153 (a) and (c) violates the rights of sexual 
minorities.  These violations are committed by the criminal justice system, the executive arm of 
government and the general public, all under the guise that section 153 has a prescription on 
unnatural offences. The paper found out that Malawi has a comprehensive bill of rights which 
enjoys the status of supremacy over all legislation including section 153 (a) and (c).   And that 
the infringements occasioned by the implementation of the provision are unjustified and fall 
short of the constitutionality test.  
Finally, the paper has established that there are impediments and some prospects to the 
decriminalization of section 153 (a) and (c).  The challenges exist despite the Constitution‟s 
guarantee on the protection of the rights of Malawians regardless of whether one belongs to a 
majority or minority group of society.  The study also noted that there is a plethora of 
international human rights law that propagates for the decriminalization of anti sodomy laws.  
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Yet, notwithstanding these laws, there seem to be an apparent disregard of the Malawi‟s 
obligation to its Constitution and international human rights covenants. 
5.5 Recommendations 
5.5.1 To the executive 
There seem to be politicization over the issue of carnal knowledge against the order of nature 
committed by men.  There is lack of political will to promote and protect the rights of sexual 
minorities who usually find themselves caught by the consensual sodomy law. The executive 
should put in place measures to ensure that individuals in same sex relationships are also 
protected by the Constitution. There is need for an open dialogue on the promotion of sexual 
minority rights. This process should be spearheaded by the executive and other politicians in a 
manner that is not insulting, castigating and intimidating to those who commit consensual 
sodomy.  The government should respect the rule of law by ensuring fulfillment of rights of 
everyone as required by domestic and international law.  They should banish harassment, forced 
medical assessments, arrest and imprisonment of adults who commit consensual sodomy.  
5.5.2 To judges 
Analysing Malawi‟s highly publicised case that came under section 153 (a) and (c), it shows the 
commencement of a very disturbing indicating that cases of this nature are most likely to be 




Judges who are generally custodians of law must abide by the notion of supremacy of the 
Malawi constitution and the respect for the rule of law.  When human rights are trumped upon, 
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even by the executive, Malawians have their trust and turn to the judiciary for protection.  
Recognizing the noble task judges have, they should not without legal basis pander to the whims 
of the majority in society.  Rather they ought to be productive and progressive by upholding the 
minimum standards in the protection of rights of every Malawian including those belonging to 
the sexual minority group.  Judges should give meaning to constitutional rights like the rights to 
equality, dignity and privacy.  Even though the constitution does not provide for sexual 
orientation as a ground for non discrimination, the Malawi courts should use international law as 
well as the rights in the constitution to protect the rights of minorities by decriminalizing 
consensual sodomy.   
In addition, there is a wealth of pronouncements from regional and international human rights 
committees declaring that anti sodomy laws offend the rights to dignity, privacy and not to be 
discriminated against.
256
  The judges should build on jurisprudence on the matter and be bold 
enough to declare this law as unconstitutional.  Criminal provisions on unnatural offences similar 
to section 153 (a) and (c) have been declared invalid in a number of states thus it is high time 
Malawi does the same.   
5.5.3 On technicalities surrounding the sitting of a Constitutional Court 
As noted in chapters three and four, a challenge on the constitutionality of any law has to be 
certified by the Chief Justice before it can be heard by the Constitutional Court.
257
 The Chief 
Justice refused to certify the challenge to the sodomy law in section 153 (a) and (c) on the sole 
ground that it did not raise any constitutional issues.  Understanding the intricacies associated 
with the promotion of human rights and more specifically rights of the minority group, the Chief 
Justice should have given a well reasoned decision for non certification of a matter.   
This is a manifestation of a major challenge in leaving the Chief Justice to be the ultimate 
decider on whether a law should be referred to a constitutionality scrutiny.  Hence the 
submission that, the Chief Justice alone should not be vested with exclusive powers to veto 
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whether proceedings relate to the application of the Constitution.  For fairness and justice to be 
seen to be done, the determination on whether a matter comes within the ambit of the 
Constitution should be done by a minimum of three judges.  By so doing, there would be some 
assurance that the decision would be enriched with balanced and well justified opinions from the 
three judges. 
5.5.4 What about the locus standi requirement? 
Persons who find themselves in conflict with section 153 (a) and (c) are in the most ridiculed 
minority group of the Malawian society.  Due to the degrading treatment and insults that these 
people receive from the public, they are likely to be timid and prefer to express their sexuality 
underground as a result their rights to equality, privacy and dignity being infringed upon.  There 
might be civil society organizations willing to challenge the validity of section 153 (a) and (c), 
however they are hindered owing to a lack of standing in the matter.    
Currently, there are two divergent views to the constitutional requirement of locus standi by the 
Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court.   The Supreme Court of Appeal has 
adopted an unduly restrictive stance of locus standi.  This approach waters down the scheme for 
the promotion and protection of human rights in Malawi.  On the other hand, the High Court is 
more liberal.  For example in Registered Trustees of the Public Affairs Committee v Attorney 
General & Others, it was stated as follows: 
The answer on locus standi on the issues raised in the originating summons will not come from how judges 
in America, in Engla d, in South Africa or elsewhere in the world construe it depending on their peculiar 
traditions and/or special wording in their Constitutions or statutes, although that might still provide us a 
guide on the trend generally applicable.  I do believe that the answer we need on this issue and in this case 
will come directly from our own Constitution, … The more genuinely we give it attention and the more 
sincerely we evaluate its enabling provisions without rushing to disable them by trying to force them to fit 
in some ancient and expiring doctrinaire concepts, the nearer we will get to the justice regime the framers 
of the Constitution contemplated for the people of Malawi.
258
 
The Court concluded in this manner: 
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…As regards the wording „with sufficient interest,‟ from the way the provision is couched, in my view, it 
amounts to deliberately choosing to walk down the narrow path rather than through the recommended 
highway of interpretation if we choose to interpret that phrase only to mean persons possessing personal 
interest and to leave out all others.  I do not doubt that a person with a clearly identifiable grievance on a 
matter he wants to bring to the Court will certainly have sufficient interest. Can we, however confidently 




The proposition that only the person whose rights are violated has a sufficient interest in the 
protection and enforcement of rights, is restrictive and unjustified.
260
 The Constitution 
recognizes a liberal approach to locus standi and public interest litigation. The High Court‟s 
liberal stand on locus standi is welcoming and could be of great assistance to the 
decriminalization of consensual sodomy in Malawi. However, it being a subordinate court to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, its stance is merely persuasive. Thus the need that Malawi Supreme 
Court being the highest court on the land, should revisit its position on locus standi in order to 
rediscover the true spirit of the Constitution and protect rights of all people including sexual 
minorities. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
The world wide recognition and protection of sexual minority rights cannot be overemphasized.  
Through the case of Republic v Steven Monjeza Soko and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa,
261
  
Malawians woke up from their slumber of denial that homosexuality is not practiced in the 
country and began to discuss the issue openly.
262
  It will probably take a while for Malawi to 
allow same sex marriages, but it is hard to defend the proscription of homosexual conduct 
between consenting adults.
263
 The starting point for Malawi would be a definite 
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decriminalization of consensual sodomy. The argument that there is no binding international 
human rights agreement that specifically provides for the protection of sexual minority rights is 
no excuse for the retention of the consensual sodomy law.  Malawi has a Constitution and it 
ratified the ICCPR among other international human rights treaties.  These pieces of law provide 
for human rights guarantees such as the rights to dignity, privacy, equality and non 
discrimination, which should be interpreted and applied to provide protection for sexual 
minorities.  Section 153 (a) and (c) of the Penal Code erodes the mentioned rights and until such 
a time that the constitutionality of this impugned law is tested, and declared unconstitutional, 
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